Hobbes Overrated, Spinoza Underrated by Lane, Jan-Erik
Journal of Research in Philosophy and History 
Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jrph 
ISSN 2576-2451 (Print)   ISSN 2576-2435 (Online) 
1 
 
Original Paper 
Hobbes Overrated, Spinoza Underrated 
Jan-Erik Lane1* 
1 Fellow with Public Policy Institute, Belgrade, Serbia 
* Jan-Erik Lane, 10 Charles Humbert, 1205 Geneva; 559 A, 3rd Floor, Thuya Street, 9th Quarter, 
Yangon. Myanmar 
 
Received: January 12, 2018   Accepted: February 3, 2018   Online Published: February 7, 2018 
doi:10.22158/jrph.v1n1p1         URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jrph.v1n1p1 
 
Abstract 
In political thought, Hobbes and Spinoza form an interesting and fascinating couple. They lived 
parallel lives and wrote much on similar topics: humans, contracts, the state and religion. Whereas 
Hobbes is considered one of the absolute top political philosophers, Spinoza has only been recognized 
as a great philosopher, due to his Ethics. But on close examination, I dare say that Spinoza outperforms 
Hobbes also on political theory and religion. The aim of this paper is to call for a re-evaluation of 
Spinoza’s political and religious philosophy. 
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1. Introduction 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Baruch Spinoza (1632-1687) lived parallel lives. They were both 
generally interested in the new science of the 17th century, but they devoted much effort to political 
philosophy, including religion. They shared several ideas, like naturalism, determinism and open or 
tacit secularism, rejecting the medieval synthesis of Aristotelianism, stoicism and Catholicism or 
Universal Christianity. Their main political texts display several stunning similarities, like the analysis 
of human egoism, brutal or self-enlightened. However, there are a few main differences, where I will 
argue that Spinoza got it right. Hobbes is generally regarded as the “greatest” of English political 
theorists, but I dare suggest that Spinoza outperforms him. 
Today we have a few excellent biographies of both Hobbes’ (Tuck, 2002; Skinner, 1996, 2008, 2009; 
Hoeffe, 2016) and Spinoza’s life and intellectual development (Nadler, 1999; Scruton 2002; Popkin, 
2004). Here, I will point out the key differences between Hobbes and Spinoza by means of quotations 
from the following texts by first Hobbes’ book and then two texts by Spinoza: 
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- Hobbes: Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and 
Civil (1651) 
- Spinoza: A Theologico-Political Treatise [Tractatus Theologico-Politicus] (1670) 
- Spinoza: A Political Treatise [Tractatus Politicus], published after his death. 
One method to structure the history of political thought is to isolate a universal theme and follow up on 
how it has been theorised over the centuries by various scholars. This approach makes sense out of 
many similarities and differences among the great political philosophers. The basic assumptions about 
humans in politics constitute one such theme: on the one hand men and women as entrusted with 
natural law rights and duties, as against humans as driven by natural needs and egoistic power on the 
other hand. Hobbes and Spinoza belong to the latter tradition, or theme. 
 
2. The State of Nature: Ex Ante Government 
In the current extensive literature on the political theory of the 16th 17th and 18th centuries, one finds 
several neat and fruitful distinctions (Skinner, 1979; Tuck, 1993; Plamenatz, 2012). For my aim, the 
distinction between two concepts of Nature is critical in order to elucidate the political theory of 
Hobbes and Spinoza.  
Several of the classics speak about “Nature,” but they refer to one of two different entities: a) the 
physical environment or Universe, and b) humanity, or the human species. The classics from Lipsius to 
Kant debate the laws of “Nature,” but the same distinction reappears with a vengeance, namely: 
= Nature’s regularities, or law-like generalizations – the mechanistic conception with e.g. Helvetius and 
Holbach; 
= Norms: The fundamental legislation for human beings, as revealed by reason, divine revelation or 
human contract–Grotius’ conception. 
Not distinguishing between moral and scientific laws is conducive to misunderstanding. 
The idea of law-like regularities in the Universe, including living organisms and thus implicitly humans, 
emerges in the Renaissance period, alongside the birth of the modern sciences. Its apex is Newton’s 
Principia, which contains many natural laws in mathematical form. Similar developments are to be 
found in other domains, like optics, medicine and, later on, in chemistry. I call this conception of a 
natural law “mechanistic” (or “Newtonian”). Applied to human beings, it is to be found with Hobbes 
and Spinoza as well as Mandeville, Helvetius and Holbach and in The Federalist Papers. The emphasis 
here is upon the IS. 
According to the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University, I quote: 
“Natural law: 1) The physical laws of nature. 2) A philosophical theory claiming to derive moral and 
legal principles from a set of universal truths about people and justice.” 
This is exactly the opposition I will try to retrieve from the political philosophy of the 16th, 17th and 18th 
centuries. I start with the approach that looks at natural law as a set of moral norms.  
(A) The idea that Nature harbours moral or legal norms that universally bind human beings in all 
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civilisations dates back to Stoicism, but it was reinvigorated during the Renaissance with Suarez and 
Grotius. Here, what is underlined is the OUGHT. 
The locus classic for the OUGHT interpretation of “Nature” is the introduction of Grotius’ magnum 
opus, On Law in War and Peace (1623). Based on a vast enquiry into the Old Testament, the New 
Testament and Greek-Roman philosophy with almost endless quotes, Grotius arrived at pinning down 
the essence of Stoicist natural law thinking, namely about (i) the Sociability of humans; (ii) not 
harming others or taking their belongings; (iii) how to compensate for damages inflicted upon others: 
(iv) “pacta sunt servanda.” 
Grotius finds these 4 principles to be valid for individuals in domestic affairs and states in international 
affairs, because they constitute Right Reason. The philosophy of the “Right Reason” is to be found in 
the work of several political theorists over these three centuries in one version or another, with Lipsius, 
Locke, Rousseau and Paine (Finnis, 2011). The debate over natural law in meaning A) continues with 
Dworkin (1998) as its strongest adherent today. His chief critique (including Hobbes) R. A. Posner 
(1992) today argues that natural law according to (A) is merely a set of moral prescriptions, and not 
LAW at all. 
(B) “Laws” in the sense of scientific law, or law-like regularities in Nature refers to the IS (existence), 
or the discovery of the laws of the Universe and the living organisms, with e.g. Newton and Darwin. 
The Renaissance period initiated the search for these natural regularities, bypassing Aristotelian 
teleology. A number of prominent political thinkers adopted B) and tried to formulate scientific laws 
politics without moral connotations, stemming from A), emphasizing not rights and altruism, but brutal 
power and self-enlightened egoism. 
2.1 Hobbes 
Hobbes’s enormous fame in Anglo-Saxon political thought rests to a large extent on his model of a 
society without government. It is written with an elegance not repeated in the section on 
Commonwealth or Religion in his Leviathan. Some of his lines have been quoted time and again in his 
picture of the state of nature. Thus, we have: 
(Q1) 
“Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the 
same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and 
their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because 
the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the 
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and 
removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Hobbes, L: Chap 11) 
Hobbes’ model of anarchy and anomie may have shocked his contemporaries, despite the horrors of the 
English civil war, but his frankness and lack of hypocrisy about humans came in fact from a critique of 
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Stoicism and Grotius 4 principles of natural law. Actually, Hobbes regards natural law as the essence of 
justice, which is often bypassed when Hobbes is said to be the father of legal positivism, i.e. law as 
command by the sovereign. We read: 
(Q2) 
“For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be 
done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to 
our natural passions that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the 
sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of 
nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if 
there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely 
on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.” (Hobbes, L: Chap 17) 
Again we quote a most famous passage from Leviathan. But it has been misunderstood. It does not 
entail a full scale rejection of natural law or Stoicism, because Hobbes still regards the norms of natural 
law to be valid, although not enforceable. When he mentions self-preservation as the first natural 
obligation, he does not endorse naturalism. In reality, Hobbes looks upon all natural laws as valid in the 
state of nature, yet unenforceable: a) “first law of nature”: “to seek peace and follow it”; “second law of 
nature”: “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself 
he shall think it necessary” (Hobbes, L: Chap 14). This is mutual self-preservation, guiding the state of 
nature; “third law of nature”: “ that men perform their covenants made”—i.e. pacta sunt sevanda with 
Grotius; “fourth law of nature”: “a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace endeavour 
that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will”; “fifth law of nature”: 
“every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest”; “sixth law of nature”: “a man ought to pardon 
the offences past of them that, repenting, desire it”; “seventh law of nature”: “ that in revenges (that is, 
retribution of evil for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good 
to follow”; Hobbes continues his Chap 15 with mentioning other laws of nature: “ at the entrance into 
conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should he 
reserved to every one of the rest”; “if a man he trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of 
the law of nature that he deal equally between them”; “But some things there be that can neither be 
divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law of nature which prescribeth equity requireth: that the 
entire right, or else (making the use alternate) the first possession, be determined by lot. For equal 
distribution is of the law of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.” 
One observes from these quotations that Hobbes is still stuck with the idea of mankind’s laws of nature. 
2.2 Spinoza 
To Spinoza on the contrary, society is a condition of “natural rights”, meaning power or lack of power. 
(Q3) 
“And so by natural right I understand the very laws or rules of nature, in accordance with which 
everything takes place, in other words, the power of nature itself. And so the natural right of universal 
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nature, and consequently of every individual thing, extends as far as its power: and accordingly, 
whatever any man does after the laws of his nature, he does by the highest natural right, and he has as 
much right over nature as he has power.” (Spinoza, TP: Chap 2: 4)  
People are bound by nothing in society, as any notion of “Pacta sunt servanda” is merely foolish: 
(Q4) 
“The pledging of faith to any man, where one has but verbally promised to do this or that, which one 
might rightfully leave undone, or vice versa, remains valid so long as the will of him that gave his word 
remains unchanged. For he that has authority to break faith has, in fact, bated nothing of his own right, 
but only made a present of words. If, then, he, being by natural right judge in his own case, comes to 
the conclusion, rightly or wrongly (for “to err is human”), that more harm than profit will come of his 
promise, by the judgement of his own mind he decides that the promise should be broken, and by 
natural right (Sec. 9) he will break the same.” (SPINOZA, TP: CHAP 2: 12). 
In Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza sticks to his naturalism and determinism from Ethics, spelling out their 
implication for politics (Nadler, 2016). There is no covenant, and no choice of a regime, as all unfolds 
from the determinism of nature, or “God” as Spinoza says. Spinoza is not a contractarian philosopher. 
The state is not based upon any contractual choice but upon natural necessity. Just as an individual is 
driven by the ambition to survive—principle of conatus, so groups of individuals do the same also 
when they constitute a dominion, or commonwealth. Just like human beings, they augment survival 
capacity by employing reason, informing the political authority to promote general well-being, or face 
competition from another commonwealth.  
Social interaction among people in the state of nature, i.e. before government, is entirely based 
upon power. Some people join in groups for egoistic reasons, which Spinoza calls “dominion”. 
One of these establishes itself as a commonwealth, i.e. a government or state. Thus, Spinoza 
solves the problem of social order, or how to escape Hobbesian anarchy, by calling in 
government. But there is no contract, because “dominion” or government form are also part of 
nature and necessity.  
According to naturalism, the competition among dominions or groups (ethnies, clans) leads to one 
commonwealth or the state, which decides over its people because it has the power to do so and it takes 
the general interests into account, because it has reason to fear that it may face resistance otherwise. 
Thus, government as part of nature has authority or power and it is reasonable to promote general 
interests in order to avoid uproar and possibly anarchy. This follows logically from enlightened egoism, 
i.e. naturalism. 
Thus, the emergence of the state or government belongs to a naturalist evolution, where the combat 
between several dominions or groups and tribes—ethnies, clans—finally result in one single dominion, 
the commonwealth that is most powerful. Consider here the political history of England or Great 
Britain with its succession of invasions by various peoples. 
On the contrary, Hobbes can only explain the emergence of the state, Commonwealth as he calls it, by 
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the contract mechanism—like Deus ex Machina. 
 
3. Commonweath: Ex Post State of Nature 
It is acknowledged by scholars who emphasize Hobbes great role in political philosophy that he 
favoured monarchy ahead of democracy. But he could conceive that the Commonwealth’s powers were 
exercised by an assembly, elected like Parliament. Was he, then, advocating a constitutional monarchy? 
No. The list of competences of the Commonwealth is long indeed. And the Commonwealth or monarch 
is not bound by any of the laws of nature that Hobbes laid down (Chap 18). 
1) Fidelity: “they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return 
to the confusion of a disunited multitude” 
2) Unchangeable: “there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and 
consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.” 
3) No opposition: “because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that 
dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or 
else justly be destroyed by the rest.” 
4) Justifiable: “it follows that whatsoever he doth, can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he 
to be by any of them accused of injustice.” 
5) Impunity: “no man that hath sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner 
by his subjects punished.” 
6) Arbiter: “it is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and 
what conducing to peace;” 
7) Control: “is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man 
may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of 
his fellow subjects: and this is it men call propriety.” 
8) Judge: “is annexed to the sovereignty the right of judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding 
all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact.” 
9) War: “is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war and peace with other nations and 
Commonwealths;” 
10) Collaborators: “is annexed to the sovereignty the choosing of all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, 
and officers, both in peace and war.” 
11) Honours: “to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour; and of 
punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law 
he hath formerly made;” (Hobbes, L: Chap 18). 
This is not an admirable list of state powers. It is simply authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Why 
monarchy? Hobbes replies: 
(Q5) 
“And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may observe: first, that whosoever beareth the 
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person of the people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person. And 
though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common interest, yet he is more, or no less, 
careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if 
the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men are 
commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private 
interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private 
interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the 
riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose 
subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war 
against their enemies; whereas in a democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much 
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a 
treacherous action, or a civil war.” (Hobbes, L: Chap. 19) 
Wishful theorizing about interest identity! As a matter of fact, there is no reciprocity at all between 
monarch and the covenants. The abuses of a monarch or single ruler cannot be hindered at all. Compare 
Spinoza’s balanced theory of rulership, with countervailing powers in each type. 
 
4. Dominion: Ex Post State of Nature 
It is true that Spinoza rejects any choice of opposition or rebellion against the political authority, 
claiming that people are “bound” to obey. Here, Spinoza agrees with Hobbes, but Spinoza brings two 
arguments for the obedience of citizens towards a government, or the risk of government oppressing its 
citizens or some of them. He argues that the commonwealth has reason and it directs them towards the 
goals of all human beings in nature, viz. peace and security. 
- The benevolence of commonwealth: since reason guides government, it looks after general 
well-being; 
- The calculation of individual benefits by obedience against the costs of opposition for an individual. 
In fact, Spinoza imagines a most powerful dominion that is not limited. He even rejects “pacta sunt 
servanda”, so underlined in Stoicism:  
(Q6)  
“Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one council or man, should without 
doubt be broken, when it is expedient for the general welfare to do so. But to decide this point, whether, 
that is, it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not, is within the right of no private 
person, but of him only who holds dominion (Sec. 3); therefore of these laws he who holds dominion 
remains sole interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate these laws, and so they do 
not really bind him who holds dominion.” (Spinoza, TP: Chap 4: 6) 
We arrive at the classical question: Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custos? (“Who will guard the guards 
themselves?”) The argument in Spinoza’s political theory is aimed at political realism and avoids 
moralism. It is mostly built up on his theory of human nature, or how people really behave. They are 
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what they are, and can only be restrained by rules: 
(Q7) 
“A dominion then, whose well-being depends on any man’s good faith, and whose affairs cannot be 
properly administered, unless those who are engaged in them will act honestly, will be very unstable. 
On the contrary, to insure its permanence, its public affairs should be so ordered, that those who 
administer them, whether guided by reason or passion, cannot be led to act treacherously or basely.” 
(Spinoza, TP: Chap 1: 6)  
The, Spinoza enters a frantic search for the choice of political institutions that enhance the prospects for 
general welfare: i.e. checks and balances in contrast to Hobbes. Here, the emphasis upon institutions is 
key in Spinoza, but it enters the choice in a problematic way: how to choose the rules that are the best?  
The risk with monarchy in Spinoza’s words or dictatorship today is that the selfish drive of the ruler 
prevails over the general welfare. Only, institutions can correct for the imbalance between egoism and 
the common interest as the unity of mind of the commonwealth. Thus, we have the following 
institutions for the monarchic regime : a set of close councillors, a set of broad councillors, constant 
change and renewal of councillors who represent the citizens, or a set of “clans” that the population is 
divided into, no standing army but a quick mobilisation effort to recruit soldiers from the citizenry if 
needed, a peculiar light taxation scheme based upon public property for the benefit of the monarch, 
complex system of jurists with oversight functions like public administration and courts, etc. Evidently, 
Spinoza thought unanimity was a proper decision rule for Parliament as well as the Courts of jurists, as 
if he did not anticipate transaction costs from such a complex monarchy, institutionally speaking. 
Yet, however detailed he rendered these rules of a monarchy for general well-being including the 
family of the majesty, he knew all too well that his naturalism implies a constant temptation by a single 
ruler to seek more power: 
(Q8)  
“It is also certain, that a commonwealth is always in greater danger from its citizens than from its 
enemies; for the good are few. Whence it follows, that he, upon whom the whole right of the dominion 
has been conferred, will always be more afraid of citizens than of enemies, and therefore will look to 
his own safety, and not try to consult his subjects’ interests, but to plot against them, especially against 
those who are renowned for learning, or have influence through wealth.” (Spinoza, TP: Chap 6: 6) 
However, Spinoza assures that if his constitutional monarchy is put in place with all its safeguards, then 
a stable monarchy for the general well-being is feasible. Perhaps he had England or Sweden in mind. 
Perhaps one may translate the institutions above to modern terminology with the cabinet as the small 
set and Parliament as the big set of councillors, while the various sets of jurists would make up a 
system of courts. 
The analysis of oligarchy or the rule of the noble proceed in the same way, i.e. adding up institutions to 
restrain egoism. Spinoza comes up again with a long and complicated institutionalisation of the rule of 
“Best” (Aristos). Thus we face a primary council of 5000 persons, with so-called syndics as the 
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ministers, a secondary council of senators and courts with jurists. Spinoza delivers strict rules about the 
soldiers, the city garrisons, payments, etc. Especially, a set of complicated election rules for both 
councils and jurists is underlined as promoting stability. Moreover, Spinoza separates between patrician 
rule in a city and a republic of many cities, also run by the few. 
Again, institutionalism inspired by historical city states in Italy and the Dutch Republic are called up to 
restrain patrician rule from degenerating into selfish promotion of narrow self-interests: 
(Q9) 
“But it may still be objected to us, that, although the constitution of dominion above set forth is 
defended by reason and common human passion, yet for all that it may at some time be overpowered. 
For there is no passion, that is not sometimes overpowered, by a stronger contrary one; for we 
frequently see the fear of death overpowered by the greed for another’s property.” (Spinoza: TP: Chap 
10: 10) 
The section of the few’s rulership is no doubt empirically inspired, although Spinoza is a rationalist, 
deducing principles from naturalism and determinism. If the few is a political party like the Communist 
Party or a Fascist Party, then Spinoza would have something to say why they degenerated in a few 
historical settings. 
The section on democracy is sad to say not finished, but it would have had the same structure of 
opposition between naturalist motives and institutionalism. Spinoza states that he regards democracy as 
a “perfectly absolute dominion” and that he intends to lay down the institutional conditions for its 
viability. But early death stopped his writing with the curious exception of excluding women. He 
stated; 
(Q10) 
“From what has been said in the last section, it is manifest that we can conceive of various kinds of 
democracy. But my intention is not to treat of every kind, but of that only, “wherein all, without 
exception, who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only, and are further independent and of 
respectable life, have the right of voting in the supreme council and of filling the offices of the 
dominion.” (Spinoza, TP: Chap 11: 3) 
 
5. Religion 
Hobbes devotes such a big part of Leviathan to religion and church that it can be deemed proper to 
compare it with Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Whereas Hobbes fails to clarify his position 
on the basic question of theism versus atheism, Spinoza’s Tractatus had an enormous influence upon 
the secularization of the West, What Hobbes maintains is just that the Sovereign is also the master of 
the Church; otherwise he just states at the very end of Leviathan: 
(Q11) 
“And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and ecclesiastical government, occasioned by 
the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jrph                 Journal of Research in Philosophy and History              Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
10 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
to set before men’s eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition 
of human nature, and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation.” 
Spinoza on the contrary launched an attack on all forms of revealed religion as mere superstition in his 
Tractatus Theologico. Whereas Hobbes speculated about what miracles could be real, Spinoza stated 
that all miracles must be seen as tales. While Hobbes held the door open for a personal God, Spinoza 
maintained that everything belongs to nature and its natural modes as well as that all religious texts 
were nothing but a set of fairy tales. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Can one compare political philosophers and come up with an ordinal ranking of excellence in argument? 
Well, at least it is often actually done, especially when textbooks are written and students given books 
to read in political theory and the philosophy of politics. Looking at the standard book-shelfs, we 
always find Hobbes, but Spinoza very seldom. My argument is that the latter is seriously 
underestimated and the former somewhat overestimated. Besides favouring the rule of one on the basis 
of a naïve argument, Hobbes is not clear about the nature of law. Spinoza on the other hand prefers the 
rule of the many in order to limit self-seeking with guile, and identifies law with positive or municipal. 
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